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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the role that conceptions of authorship play 
in  governing participation in society. Following a brief review of 
the literature, the philosophical method of conceptual analysis is 
combined with historical examples to argue that conceptions of 
authorship have at least three universal  features.  First, 
'authorship' demarcates certain activities and practices. Secondly, 
conceptions of authorship contain a normative element which is 
used to identify which activities and practices are constitutive. 
Finally, once identified those activities and practices become 
eligible for social, legal, and economic benefits that  enable 
participation in the i-society. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Authorship is a topic that has been studied by researchers from a 
wide variety of fields, including literary  theory, sociology, history, 
bibliography, and critical  theory. Each of these researchers are 
equipped with very different  sets of theoretical commitments, 
preferred methodologies, and objects of study. 
Literary theorists have typically focused on the role, or lack 
thereof, that authors have played in fixing or constructing the 
meaning and significance of their texts. Towards this end, they 
have often  been particularly concerned with teasing out the 
intentions of individual authors through close readings of their 
works, correspondence, unpublished materials, and other 
documentation of their lives. In Barthes “The Death of the 
Author,” he argues not that individuals have ceased to engage in 
text-producing activities, but  that  the author is not, and  should not 
be, the figure around which meaning and significance are 
constructed (Barthes, 1977). 
While often grouped with Barthes’ critique of intentionalist 
approaches, Foucault’s seminal “What is an author,” is better 
characterized as a broad sketch of a research agenda which aims 
to  identify the social, legal, and economic processes that lead to 
the development of the particular role played by the author-
function. Following Foucault, the legal historian David Saunders 
has stated that "it is certainly  valuable to distinguish between the 
individuals who writes and the authorial personality, status, or 
function which he or she might bear and to which legal capacities 
might  attach" (1994, p. 99). So, too, with  the actual practices and 
activities that individuals may engage in, and the special 
recognition or function that is borne out by conceptions of 
authorship.
Despite the attention and effort that has recently been paid to the 
subject, there is relatively little consensus regarding what 
authorship is. There is certainly no widely agreed upon definition 
of authorship, despite the multitude of historically and culturally 
specific definitions of authorship that  have been used in the 
literature. Authorship has been variously defined, implicitly or 
explicitly, as the professional, market-driven production of 
cultural commodities (cf. Adams, 1990; Griffin, 1990; Turnovsky, 
2003); the autonomous creation of original texts or ideas (cf. 
Haynes, 2005); and authorship as compilation or craftsmanship 
(cf. Summit, 2003; Minnis, 1984). 
Attempts to define the term are complicated by  the fact  that 
authorship is a social construct that has been constructed in 
different ways in different historical periods and contexts 
(Summit, 2005).  At best, these definitions are well-suited to 
describing authorship within certain historical  periods or contexts, 
but as authorship  is not limited to a particular historical period, 
nor isolated to  any particular culture, none of these definitions are 
well-suited to describing authorship as a global phenomenon. In 
particular, these sorts of definitions are unable to capture 
authorship practices in the early manuscript  period, or authorship 
outside of the West and among indigenous peoples. As a result, 
they are poor responses to the question, “What is authorship?’
Given the recent attention and the central role ‘authorship’ plays 
in  our  conceptual web, it would be useful for researchers and 
scholars to have some consensus regarding an answer to the 
question posed above. The philosophical method of conceptual 
analysis may be a useful tool to identify such  common ground. 
Conceptual analysis can generally be described as the process of 
breaking a concept down into its basic components in order to 
reveal its logical  structure. Despite the fact that substantive 
conceptions of authorship have changed over time and differ 
between cultures, it  is possible that the structure and function of 
the concept may be stable. 
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Conceptual analysis is also a useful  methodology in this particular 
case, as it allows us to avoid problematic anachronism, teleology, 
and arguably cultural specificity which can make universal 
definitions impossible, and consensus in a multidisciplinary 
environment difficult.  I argue that there are several  universal 
features of ‘authorship,’ and that these features shed light  on the 
role that conceptions of authorship play governing participation  in 
society. By illustrating these features with historical examples, we 
can also attempt to ensure that they are consistent  with the 
historical record. While by no means offering a universal 
definition of authorship, these features do form the basis for a 
useful theoretical framework. 
2. DEMARCATION
Quite apparently, not all text-producing activities and practices 
are those which we consider authorship. As Foucault observes, "a 
private letter may well have a signer-it does not  have an author; a 
contract may have a guarantor-it does not have an author. An 
anonymous text posted on a wall probably has a writer-but not an 
author" (Foucault, 1979, 148). This illustrates an important 
feature of society:  only certain kinds of activities and practices are 
constitutive of authorship in any given context.
Authorship is something that persons do, either alone or in 
concert. It refers to a particular set of activities or practices. There 
are a wide range of practices and activities which have at times 
been associated with authorship: writing, publication, patronage, 
compilation, dictation, editing, etc. (cf. Griffin, 2005; Summit 
2003; Dobranski, 1999). This list is by no means exhaustive, 
rather, it is intended to demonstrate the variety  of activities and 
practices which  are candidates for authorship. Not all, or even 
most, of these activities or practices have been constitutive of 
authorship in  any particular context. Depending on the context 
and historical period, different activities have been interpreted as 
"authoring" (Summit, 2003). The same activities and practices in 
one historical context that were considered authorship may not 
necessarily have been considered authorship in another. 
Conceptions and definitions of authorship necessarily identify 
which activities and practices are constitutive of the concept. In 
other words, 'authorship' necessarily demarcates certain activities 
and practices. 
3. NORMATIVE ELEMENTS OF 
'AUTHORSHIP'
If we accept that 'authorship' demarcates certain practices or 
activities, we can further examine the means of demarcation:  that 
is, how and why are certain practices selected but not others? I 
argue that  conceptions of authorship necessarily contain a 
normative element that  is used to identify those activities and 
practices that are consistent with the standard. 
3.1 Types of normative judgments
Descriptive statements are those that purport to describe some 
feature of the world:  "The sky is blue," "The table has four legs." 
These can generally be contrasted with  normative claims that 
involve evaluative judgments and prescriptions: "Sushi  is good," 
"That's not fair," "One ought never lie" (cf. Wengert, 2001). 
There are also several different classes or categories of normative 
judgments or claims: aesthetic, epistemic, and moral  judgments 
are each different sorts of normative judgments. 
Aesthetic judgments involve judgments of taste and beauty. 
“Sushi  is good”  is an example of an aesthetic judgment, as is “The 
Pieta is beautiful.”  Similarly, the statement that “Mann’s The 
Magic Mountain  is a masterpiece” is also an aesthetic judgment. 
In arguing  that ‘authorship’ involves a normative element that is 
used to demarcate certain activities and practices, I do  not mean 
to  argue that ‘authorship’ involves aesthetic judgments. Rather, I 
contend that in addition to judgments of taste or beauty, 
conceptions of authorship also contain moral  and epistemic 
normative judgments which are used identify certain kinds of 
practices and activities that are deemed more worthy or valuable. 
Moral judgments and claims are those which track the rightness 
or wrongness and goodness or badness of actions or character. 
Normative epistemic judgments or claims track features of some 
of our epistemological beliefs about how we acquire knowledge 
and what knowledge consists in. Not all  epistemic judgments or 
claims are normative. Statements or judgments concerning truth 
are arguably descriptive. However, statements and judgments 
concerning knowledge are normative, and are also importantly 
involved in conceptions of authorship.  
3.2 The Romantic conception of authorship
To illustrate, let  us consider the Romantic conception of 
authorship: the autonomous creation of original ideas and text (cf. 
Haynes, 2005; Woodmansee, 1984). This particular conception of 
authorship involves the notions of 'originality' and 'genius' and 
can be traced as far back as Edward Young's Conjectures on 
Original  Composition (1759). His work would be influential on 
many German philosophers during the 18th century, who adopted 
his thoughts on original  composition in their own works on the 
nature of authorship and literary property. 
Prior to this, the received view of authorship was the idea that the 
author is best characterized as an artisan or as a craftsman: he uses 
traditional materials, rules, and ideas, those that  had been handed 
down by posterity, in order to produce certain effects. Authors 
could occasionally move beyond the mere manipulation of 
received goods to create works that were truly great. In these 
instances, authors were said to be inspired: typically by the Muses 
or God (Woodmansee, 1984). What is important is that the source 
of inspiration was external to the individuals who were actually 
writing. 
Young substituted originality and genius for inspiration. The 
source of the great works was no longer situated outside of the 
author, but within: 
The mind of a man of Genius is a
fertile and pleasant field, pleasant as 
Elysium, and fertile as Tempe; it enjoys 
a perpetual Spring. Of that Spring, 
Originals are the fairest Flowers: 
Imitations are of quicker growth, but 
fainter bloom (1759). 
This particular passage highlights two features that have been 
inherited by the Romantic conception of authorship. First, it is 
notable that the source of originality lies in the mind of the writer. 
Secondly, while the genius produces both works that are 
imitations and works that are original, original  works are to be 
valued more than imitations. While this may seem both intuitive 
and obvious to  the modern reader, it  is a marked contrast to  earlier 
scholastic attitudes towards composition, knowledge, and 
authority. 
On this interpretation of authorship, we can equate "Mary is an 
author," with "Mary autonomously creates original ideas and 
text." That statement is much stronger than descriptive statements 
such as "Mary writes" or "Mary wrote that text." While the latter 
two statements are descriptive accounts of a particular individual's 
activities, the former involves an evaluative judgment about the 
nature and  result of those activities: that Mary acts autonomously, 
and that  the results are "original." Built  into this particular 
concept of authorship is the notion that  originality is to be sought 
and encouraged. 
4. SOCIAL, LEGAL, AND ECONOMIC 
BENEFITS
Having hopefully established the normative feature and the 
demarcative function of 'authorship', we can identify another 
common feature:  once certain practices or activities have been 
demarcated as constitutive of authorship, those practices and 
activities are eligible for certain social, economic, and legal 
benefits. These benefits play an important role in governing 
participation in society. As a result, there are practical 
ramifications to the particular conception of authorship that 
obtains in any context.
The legal instrument of copyright, for example, is designed to 
give individuals the exclusive rights to copy, distribute, display, 
and make derivative works. These rights give copyright holders 
an ability to control how works are accessed, disseminated, and 
used within society. It also allows authors to profit, either socially, 
economically, or both, from the distribution and sale of their 
works. Copyright  originates with authors, but only certain kinds 
of works are eligible for copyright. Eligibility is dependent upon a 
particular normative conception of authorship:  works must 
display originality in order to  qualify. The following sections will 
attempt to demonstrate that intellectual property laws, copyright 
in  this case, often assume or are based upon particular 
conceptions of authorship.
4.1 'Authorship' and copyright
The German states were slow to adopt copyright laws. Even as 
they did so, each state only had the ability  to enforce the laws 
within  their particular territory. Combined with a shared language 
and literary culture, this created an environment ripe for piracy 
(Saunders, 1992). Piracy negatively affected writers, as it reduced 
printers' ability to compensate them for their works. Most authors 
wanted to end piracy and therefore wanted more stringent, 
enforceable copyright laws that  recognized their interests and 
rights in regard to their work. 
The 18th century German philosophers work on the nature of 
authorship and composition was motivated by, and contingent 
upon, a particular set of historical circumstances (cf. Saunders, 
1992; Woodmansee, 1984). They were doing more than just 
theorizing about the nature of authorship:  they were utilizing this 
conception of authorship as an argument for a particular kind of 
intellectual property law. If an authors' work is an expression of 
his or her personality or essence, who else would it  belong to but 
him or her? They were establishing the groundwork for what 
would later be called the rights of personality which formed the 
basis for much of the Continental  framework of intellectual 
property. 
Intellectual property laws tend to  presume or rely upon particular 
conceptions of authorship. This is true not only of the Continental 
framework for intellectual property, but also of the Anglo-
American model instigated with  the landmark 1710 Statute of 
Anne. The Statute of Anne was the first legal copyright law 
implemented, and also marked the first  time that authors, rather 
than printers or booksellers, were the locus of the right to copy, 
sell, and distribute works. For our purposes, it is important that 
rather than cementing the status of literary property in early 
modern England, the Statute of Anne sparked a debate on the 
nature of authorship and literary property that lasted from 1710 
until 1774, with the House of Lords ruling on Donaldson v. 
Becket (Rose, 1994). 
An important thread running through the debate was the role of 
authors within society. The early 18th century was the beginning 
of the rise of the professionalization of authorship heralded by the 
growth of a literary marketplace and a decline in the importance 
of certain kinds of patronage. Authors, including the likes of 
Samuel Johnson and Alexander Pope, were increasingly 
considered independent professionals. This particular conception 
of authorship could  be characterized as the production of cultural 
commodities. When the House of Lords ruled in 1774 to uphold 
the limits to  copyright terms established by the Statute of Anne, 
the House effectively ruled in favor of a conception of authorship 
that presented the author as a proprietor, whose interests must be 
balanced with those of the public (cf. Ross, 1992). 
These two competing conceptions of authorship, as the production 
of cultural  commodities and as the autonomous original text and 
ideas, form the basis for two very different models of intellectual 
property law. The Continental model, which presumes the 
Romantic notion of authorship, assumes that  authors have certain 
inalienable rights in regards to their works. Our Anglo-American 
model, while influenced by the Romantic notion in it's 
requirements on originality, is still primarily  based on the idea 
that the author is best characterized as a proprietor.
5. AUTHORSHIP AND PARTICIPATION
As demonstrated by the fact that these laws and policies presume 
a particular conception of authorship, there are ethical 
considerations regarding whether that conception of authorship 
fosters participation in the i-society. The activities and practices 
demarcated by conceptions of authorship become eligible for 
social, legal, and economic benefits; but those activities and 
practices that  are not demarcated can be hindered and individuals' 
engaging in them may be excluded. This section of the paper will 
use examples of indigenous cultural  production to demonstrate 
that there are important ethical considerations to be made 
regarding how we foster participation in the i-society, and what 
our objectives ought to be.
First, however, it will  be necessary to demonstrate the importance 
of authors and authorship to participation in society. The 
following section endeavors to  lay out the relationship between 
authorship and participation. 
5.1 The importance of authors and authorship 
to participation in society
Whether we characterizes ourselves as members of an information 
society, knowledge society, post-industrial society, or dismiss 
such assertions as misleading, it seems relatively uncontroversial 
to  note that the means through which information is accessed, 
disseminated, and used are changing. Perhaps more controversial, 
but nonetheless plausible, is the assertion that information itself is 
becoming or has become more fundamental to the cultural, 
economic, and social activities that we engage in. 
Regardless, it remains true that before information or knowledge 
can be accessed or acquired, it  must  first be created or be 
available through some means. Primarily, information or 
knowledge is possessed by individuals who then choose to share 
or exchange it. Writing, editing, collaborating, and other similar 
activities can be means of sharing and exchanging that 
information or knowledge. From the foregoing sections, it should 
hopefully be clear that authorship, then, is a particular kind of 
sharing and  exchange of information, one that is facilitated by the 
social, legal, and economic benefits that  are conferred upon those 
activities and practices that are deemed constitutive. 
Writing, collaborating, editing and similar activities are just a few 
ways that individuals participate in society by sharing the 
knowledge or information they have. And when individuals 
access and use the products of those activities, they, too, are 
participating in  society. This raises an important point about these 
activities and participation: by engaging in them individuals 
actively participate in society, however, their engagement also 
enables other individuals to participate by accessing the products 
of those activities.
5.2 Indigenous attitudes towards intellectual 
property and authorship
As noted above, the Anglo-American system of intellectual 
property law is deeply influenced by the idea that the author is 
best characterized as a proprietor: an individual  involved in the 
production of commodities which are available through a market, 
whose interest must be balanced with that of the public. This can 
be contrasted with the Continental model of intellectual property 
law that  is apt  to consider works created by an author to be an 
expression or  manifestation of her personality or essence. While 
these are markedly different approaches to intellectual  property 
law influenced by different notions of authorship, they are more 
closely related to each other than to indigenous or non-Western 
conceptions of authorship and intellectual property. 
Both conceptions assume that  the appropriate locus of intellectual 
property is that of the individual. Many indigenous and non-
Western cultures view the community or society as the  possessors 
of ideas, information, and knowledge (cf. Brown, 2003; Townley, 
2002; Endeshaw, 2005). While individual writers, artists, or 
storytellers may be the custodians or guardians who are entrusted 
with  preserving and sharing such information or knowledge, their 
role as authors is more akin to that of a trustee (Brown, 2003, p. 
46). Ultimate responsibility  and ownership for the intellectual 
property rests with the community, group, or society.
The case of Bulun Bulun and Milpurrurru v. R & T Textiles Pty. 
Ltd. is a good illustration of the way that many indigenous 
cultures view the relationship between an author and the 
community (Brown, 2003, p. 44).  The first plaintiff in this 
copyright infringement suit, Bulun Bulun, is an Aboriginal  artist 
whose work has attained a global following. The second plaintiff, 
George Milpurrurru, is  a senior clan official for the Ganalbingu 
community. When a textile company imported fabric containing 
images from one of Bulun Bulun’s more famous paintings without 
his consent, Bulun Bulun and Milpurrurru together brought suit: 
they alleged that not only was Bulun Bulun harmed, but  his 
community, as well  (Brown, 2003, p. 45-46).   While Bulun Bulun 
may be “authorized”  by his clan to depict certain kinds of 
religious and cultural imagery, he does so for the benefit and 
under the supervision of the traditional owners: the clan. 
This particular case illustrates the role that many indigenous 
authors or creators play within their communities. Case law 
regarding indigenous cultural production has in  many ways 
improved, for instance, much indigenous art was once deemed 
uncopyrightable: folklore, or “folkloric”  art, was regarded as 
lacking the requisite originality (Brown, 2003, p. 44). 
These conceptions of authorship and intellectual property  are not 
uncommon among indigenous peoples and  outside of the West. In 
Asia, difficulty enforcing intellectual property law is partly 
attributable to differing social and cultural assumptions regarding 
the nature of intellectual property, namely that intellectual 
“property” is ultimately held by society or the community as a 
whole (cf. Endeshaw, 2005).
At this point, it should  hopefully be clear that conceptions of 
authorship underlying intellectual property law are fundamentally 
different from those held by many indigenous communities and 
non-Western cultures. 
5.3 Ethical considerations
By conferring certain social, legal, or economic benefits on the 
activities and practices that are deemed constitutive, the notion of 
authorship facilitates participation in  society for those who 
engage in those activities, and also  for other individuals accessing 
the products of those activities. Depending on the particular 
conception of authorship that obtains, more or fewer of those 
activities will be facilitated, which will have consequences for not 
only  those engaging in them, but also for those who participate by 
accessing those products.
It does not follow from the fact that the conceptions of authorship 
which underlie intellectual property law are fundamentally 
different from those which obtain in indigenous cultures that the 
conception somehow fails to foster participation in society, or that 
other conceptions of authorship foster participation more 
effectively. But,  it does demonstrate that we are faced with a set 
of alternatives. Presented with such, we can ask ourselves which 
conception is the best means to foster participation. The final 
section of this paper attempts to identify one ethical consideration 
regarding conceptions of authorship and participation in society, 
though ultimately abstains on the issue. 
Before we can address the question of which conception of 
authorship best fosters participation in society, we must first 
address the question of what our goals are. A natural objective 
regarding participation would  be to  maximize participation in 
terms of the total number of individuals who participate. Another 
compelling objective would be to ensure participation among the 
least-advantaged members of society. There are certainly other 
objectives that  we might adopt, however, given limited time and 
space, I will devote my attention to what seem the most 
compelling candidates. 
5.3.1 Maximizing participation among individuals
In his defense of intellectual freedom, John Stuart Mill  provides 
us with one reason to think that maximizing participation among 
individuals would be optimal:  exposure to  a wide array of 
opinions, perspectives, and beliefs is the best means to ensure that 
individuals acquire true beliefs. If, as Mill  argues, truth is 
generally more useful than falsity, then maximizing participation 
among individuals would be a way to attempt to ensure that  they 
acquired more useful beliefs (Mill, 1989). If this were our goal, 
then we would ideally want a conception of authorship which 
would facilitate participation for as large a number of individuals 
as possible. 
5.3.2 Ensuring participation among the least-
advantaged members of society
Alternatively, we might decide that in the interest of being just, 
we might decide to  ensure participation among the least-
advantaged members of society. While the best way to ensure 
participation is not immediately clear, John Rawls’ could 
potentially provide us with  the principles that  might guide such an 
endeavor (Rawls, 1999). 
Consistent  with Rawls’ two principles of justice, to ensure 
participation among the least advantaged members of society we 
might  adopt a conception of authorship that preserved an 
egalitarian right to participate, such that individuals have equal 
opportunity to engage in the practices and activities that are 
constitutive. Any differences in  the way social, legal, economic 
benefits of demarcation would be distributed would need to  be 
guided by the principle that inequalities should be structured in 
such as way as to benefit the least advantaged members of society. 
6. CONCLUSION
The picture that emerges from the above discussion of authorship 
hopefully establishes that conceptions of authorship  utilize 
normative judgments regarding which text-producing practices 
and activities are more valuable in order to establish the limits and 
boundaries of the term. Once demarcated, those activities and 
practices are eligible for certain legal, economic, and social 
benefits that facilitate participation. This framework for 
authorship provides a means of establishing non-arbitrary order 
on  what  is a rich  and varied subject, as well as raises some 
important ethical considerations regarding which conceptions of 
authorship best foster participation in society.
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